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Abstract 
 
Over the past two decades, cluster policies have become a standard instrument of 
public authorities and economic development practitioners in many parts of the 
world. This paper takes a critical stance on this phenomenon and provides 
theoretical arguments that challenge the widespread application of cluster initiatives 
to promote long-term regional development. We distinguish between and compare 
two main bodies of thought: the neoclassical view and the agglomeration view. We 
show that there are no rationales for cluster policy from the perspective of 
neoclassical theory. The agglomeration view, in contrast, provides a convincing 
conceptual basis for justifying economic policies implemented in form of cluster 
initiatives. At the same time, however, it points to major problems related with the 
cluster policy approach. We identify and elaborate on three essential difficulties, i.e. 
the proper (1) targeting, (2) dosing, and (3) timing of cluster policy actions. We 
highlight that the problems related with these fundamental issues of each public 
initiative constitute powerful pitfalls and booby traps of cluster policies.  
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1 Introduction 
By publishing the book “The Competitive Advantage of Nations” in 1990 and subsequent 
writings (Porter 1998, 2000, 2003), Michael Porter triggered a massive wave of publications 
about the spatial clustering of industries and related policy actions (recent contributions 
include amongst others Diez-Vial 2011, Drucker 2011, Engel and del-Palacio 2011, Arikan 
and Schilling 2011, Guillaume and Doloreux 2011, Heebels and Boschma 2011). On the one 
hand, Porter’s arguments generated a substantial amount of academic work dealing with the 
conceptual foundation of clusters and their empirical evidence (Swann et al. 1998, Gordon 
and McCann 2000, Malmberg and Maskell 2002, Martin and Sunley 2003). On the other 
hand, Porter’s work also inspired policymakers to utilize clusters as a lever to strengthen the 
economies of their respective countries or regions. 
 
It is this latter aspect, that of “cluster policy”, which is at the heart of this paper. We will deal 
with the following questions: To what extent is cluster policy a reliable form of policy for 
stimulating regional economic prosperity? What are the obstacles for policymakers to 
adequately identify the target of their policy, design their policy, and time its implementation? 
How certain or uncertain is it that cluster policy actions will turn out to be successful? How 
high is the risk of wasting scarce economic resources? 
 
We will approach these questions from a purely theoretical point of view. In the context of 
this paper we define cluster policy as “a policy that invests resources into the formation, 
support, and development of one or more industry clusters with the goal to strengthen the 
economic position of their policy’s target area in the long run”. This definition differs from 
most others (e.g., Andersson et al. 2004, Borrás and Tsagdis 2008) by the explicit inclusion of 
the long term goal. In most practical approaches to cluster policy this aspect is left implicit: 
Many economically successful regions contain clusters and successful clusters can stimulate 
the economic performance of regions. So, develop your clusters and economic success will 
follow, many policy makers are led to conclude. As we will show in this paper, this 
conclusion is based on very weak grounds. It is the theoretical basis of the cluster concept and 
particularly its foundation in the theory of agglomeration economies that triggers these 
concerns. On the one hand, agglomeration economies explain the very existence of industry 
clusters and their crucial role in economic development, but on the other hand they challenge 
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the conclusion that policy can generate economic prosperity in the long run by creating, 
supporting or nurturing industry clusters. 
 
In the core part of the paper we distinguish two bodies of thought: the neoclassical view and 
the agglomeration view. We show that only the agglomeration view provides a convincing 
conceptual basis for justifying cluster initiatives. At the same time, however, it implies a 
fundamental dilemma for the cluster policy approach. As we will show in the following 
sections, the agglomeration view basis of cluster policy makes it particularly difficult and 
risky for policy makers to implement such a policy. We identify and elaborate on three 
essential difficulties, i.e. the proper (1) targeting, (2) dosing, and (3) timing of cluster policy 
actions. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in the next section (Section 2) we will take a 
quick look at cluster policy as it is currently applied. Section 3 will turn to the theoretical 
foundations of cluster policy. We will look at two alternative views on how the economy 
works. In this section we will also discuss some of the implications these views have for the 
structure and behavior of the economic system. In Section 4 we will apply these insights to 
cluster policy. We will investigate to what extent the theoretical basis of the policy can assist 
policy makers in the most fundamental choices they have to make when designing their 
cluster policy. How many resources should be devoted to the policy? What should be the 
target of the policy? At what time should the stimulus of the cluster policy be injected into the 
economy? The paper closes with a concluding section. 
 
2 Current cluster policy practice 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the cluster notion enjoys increasing popularity with policy 
actors and economic development practitioners (Martin and Sunley 2003, Borrás and Tsagdis 
2008). Over the past two decades, public promotion of clusters has become a “standard” tool 
of policy actors at the regional, national and international level. Cluster initiatives are now an 
accepted part of regional development policy, not only in developed countries but 
increasingly also in post-socialist transition countries and developing countries (Sölvell et al. 
2003, Ketels et al. 2006). 
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Cluster policies come in many shapes. Some are directed towards promoting existing clusters 
whilst others intend to create new ones. Many countries and regions have set up initiatives to 
(1) seed new high-technology clusters (in particular in the fields of biotechnology and ICT), 
(2) stimulate the growth of those already located in the region and (3) prevent established 
ones from decline. Indeed, global cluster initiate surveys (Anderson et al. 2004, Sölvell 2009) 
provide evidence for the ongoing cluster euphoria in policy in many parts of the world and 
they suggest that cluster policies take a variety of forms. Anderson et al. (2004) distinguish 
between five approaches of cluster policy, which are sometimes combined in one concrete 
cluster initiative. These approaches comprise 
 
• broker policies (measures directed towards stimulation of dialogue, communication 
and cooperation among cluster actors), 
• demand side policies (public procurement, fostering the development of observatories 
and expanding the range of information and data about markets), 
• training policies (vocational training programs), 
• measures for the promotion of international linkages (attraction of inward FDI, 
support of the formation of export networks, public sponsoring of marketing 
campaigns, etc.), and 
• framework policies (policies targeting infrastructure and institutional conditions) 
 
Also earlier work done by Boekholt and Thuriaux (1999) confirms the view that a large 
variety of measures are employed within the context of cluster policy. These include mapping 
exercises to identify clusters, networking programs to encourage firms to take up 
opportunities for collaboration with other firms, setting up of cluster specific technology and 
research centers, attraction of FDI to deal with the problem of missing elements and support 
for start-up firms in order to promote cluster growth. There is, however, little systematic 
evidence on the success of many cluster policy actions (see, for instance, Martin and Sunley 
2003). 
 
3 The theoretical background of cluster policy 
Many definitions of clusters include a reference to the agglomeration of related economic 
activities. For example, Porter (1998) provides the following definition: “A cluster is a 
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geographically proximate group of interconnected companies and related institutions in a 
specific market, linked by interdependences in providing a related set of products and/or 
services” (p. 197). In this sense clusters can be seen as a conceptual step in the tradition of 
Marshall (1920) who underlined the importance of positive agglomeration economies. 
Another predecessor of clusters is the concept of network externalities (Rohlfs 1974, 
Economides 1996), which highlights the positive role of interconnectedness and of the 
corresponding communication standards. 
 
The fact that the cluster concept is seen to be based on agglomeration economies, network 
externalities and other forms of economic externalities also relates it to other important 
theoretical developments of recent decades.The most important ones are evolutionary 
economics and its application to economic geography (Martin and Sunley 2006, 2011, Wolfe 
and Gertler 2006, Frenken et al. 2007, Ter Val and Boschma 2011) and that of new growth 
theory and new economic geography (Aghion and Howitt 1998, Krugman 1991, Fujita et al. 
1999, Fujita and Thisse 2002). All these theories share the conviction that the mentioned 
externalities are an essential feature of modern economies rather than an isolated deficit – a 
market failure – that needs to be corrected by policy. 
 
When we want to analyze the opportunities that cluster policy defined in the above mentioned 
way has for influencing the long term economic prosperity of a region, we need some 
understanding of how a regional economy works. At a general level we can distinguish 
between two main views: 
 
1. The “neoclassical view”, and 
2. The “agglomeration view”. 
 
Both views that we will discuss in more detail below take a comprehensive look at the 
economy and its various elements and interactions. In a general equilibrium perspective they 
take into account commodity, labor, capital, and additional markets as well as the transfers 
between these markets and between the spatial units considered.  
 
The two views differ by their treatment of agglomeration forces and transportation costs. The 
neoclassical view excludes both agglomeration economies and transportation costs by 
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assumption. This simplifies the formal structure of the model and allows us to derive some 
very clear and specific results. The agglomeration view, on the other hand, allows for positive 
agglomeration forces that are counteracted by transportation costs. Depending on the 
relationship between these forces, the models of the agglomeration view lead to different 
results. Since the other assumptions of the neoclassical view usually remain unchanged in the 
agglomeration view models, one can view the neoclassical view as a special case of the 
agglomeration view. The former results from the latter when we assume neither 
agglomeration economies nor transport costs do exist in the economy. 
 
Neoclassical view 
In regional economics the neoclassical view results from the application of the principles and 
assumptions of neoclassical economics to a regional economy. The neoclassical view is “what 
is taught to students, what is mainstream economics today” (Weintraub 1993). Neoclassical 
economics is based on a set of assumptions and its theoretical conclusions are deduced there 
from. The most important tool of neoclassical economists is mathematics, in particular 
calculus. The application of these assumptions and of the economic toolbox has led to a 
consistent set of arguments and to principles that are widely shared by economists. In the 
context of our paper, a brief discussion of the neoclassical view is justified by the influence it 
still tends to have on policy considerations. Most of the market principles that guide the 
design and implementation of some of our policies are derived from the – fairly limited – 
perspective of the neoclassical view. 
 
The most important assumptions of the neoclassical view are utility/profit maximization, 
perfect information, perfect mobility, and perfect competition. The neoclassical assumptions 
guarantee that economic actors always pursue their self-interest and in doing so are not 
restricted by limited information, transaction and mobility costs or power of rival actors. 
Market prices always represent the scarcity in the respective market and signal opportunities 
to increase their utility or profit. Because of the assumptions actors will always pursue these 
opportunities. In the context of our paper the assumption of “perfect competition” and the 
assumption of “perfect mobility” are of particular relevance. 
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The assumption of “perfect competition” implies that production takes place according to a 
linear homogeneous production function. This implies that changing all the inputs to a certain 
production process by a certain factor changes the output by the same factor. So, irrespective 
of the scale of production, the costs per unit remain the same, larger or smaller units do not 
have an economic advantage over others, and agglomeration economies are excluded by 
assumption. We use the term “agglomeration economies” here in a broad sense. They include 
all effects of concentration of production irrespective of them being within a plant, firm or 
sector (economies of scale) or between those units (“external economies”, “localization 
economies”, “urbanization economies”). In summarizing, it can be said that in the 
neoclassical view there is no economic incentive toward the concentration of production. If 
such an incentive existed in one sector, for example, it would work toward the concentration 
of all the global production in this sector in one location. Because of the assumption of perfect 
mobility, there is no force counteracting this concentration tendency. This would generate one 
monopolist in this sector, contradicting the requirements of perfect competition.  
 
The assumption of perfect mobility eliminates one of the most important elements of spatial 
economics: transport costs. The assumption implies that all goods, services, and individuals 
can be transferred across space without any costs in terms of money, time, and effort. This 
assumption guarantees that there is “one” market with many suppliers and customers instead 
of various spatial markets which conflict with perfect competition because of their limited 
numbers of actors.  
 
Because of the assumption of perfect mobility it is difficult for neoclassical economics to deal 
with regions and space. When we relax this assumption and allow for physical distance and 
transportation costs, we either get in conflict with other neoclassical assumptions, like perfect 
competition, or end up in the perverse structure of “backyard capitalism” (Mills 1972, Starrett 
1978). With transportation costs it is profitable for producers to breakup production facilities 
and locate them as closely as possible to the location of the customers. Because of the 
assumption of perfect competition, which implies the absence of agglomeration economies, 
this can be pursued until all products are produced in the backyard of their respective 
customer. In this “backyard capitalism” there are only subsistence industrialists and no large 
scale production facilities that require external labor. No products are shipped from one 
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location to another, no workers commute from home to work. Although transportation costs 
are the ultimate reason for this structure, in equilibrium no resources are used for transport. 
 
This example shows clearly how the assumption of perfect competition and the assumption of 
perfect mobility are related. If we want to avoid outcomes of complete concentration and of 
“backyard capitalism”, whenever we relax one of the assumptions, we also have to adjust the 
other. They relate to counteracting forces in a spatial economy. Agglomeration economies 
pull production together while transportation costs pull it apart. 
 
An immediate consequence of its assumptions is that the neoclassical model is a linear model. 
This has a number of implications which are important for its policy recommendations: 
 
• Marginal changes lead to marginal reactions: In all markets, a small increase in 
demand yields a small increase in the respective price which in turn stimulates a small 
increase in supply which brings supply and demand back to equilibrium. There are no 
threshold levels that need to be crossed before markets react. Consequently, there are 
no beaten paths that the economy will follow nor can it be locked into a specific 
equilibrium by the structure it generates. 
• There exists only one equilibrium outcome: This equilibrium is Pareto-efficient and 
socially optimal. The assumptions ensure continuously increasing supply and 
continuously decreasing demand curves which intersect in one point which defines the 
market equilibrium. Since actors will trade or produce only when they can increase 
their utility or profit, everyone reaches the highest level of the objective function that 
can be achieved under the existing constraints. The resulting equilibrium is therefore 
optimal for every individual actor as well as for society as a whole. 
• Disturbances are washed away over time: They lead to deviations from equilibrium 
which triggers market forces that bring the economy back toward equilibrium. 
Therefore, disturbances can only have a temporary effect that disappears over time. 
The long run outcome of the economy cannot be changed by external disturbances. 
 
These implications lead to the famous policy recommendation of neoclassical economics that 
policy should leave the economy alone. The market mechanism generates the optimal 
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outcome through its “invisible hand” and does not need any help from policy makers. Policy 
interventions may actually just generate disturbances that temporarily prevent the system from 
reaching the equilibrium. Moreover, according to the neoclassical view policy interventions 
only have temporary effects and cannot alter the long run outcome. At best they are useless, 
but probably even damaging and a waste of resources.  
 
It is quite obvious that cluster policy does not fit into the framework of the neoclassical view 
of the economy. In a neoclassical economy, any attempt to concentrate production in one 
region will immediately generate counteracting forces that will disperse production again. The 
concentration of production generated by, say, cluster policy will drive up wages and drive 
down capital rents in the respective region relative to others (Borts and Stein 1964) which will 
stimulate workers to move toward the region and capital to move away from it. Through this 
effect the perfect mobility of resources will dissolve the production cluster again. 
Consequently, cluster policy of the type that we have defined it above, will not work in a 
neoclassical economy and the funds allocated to this policy will simply be wasted. 
 
Agglomeration view 
In the late 1980s the neoclassical view was more and more criticized. The main source of 
criticism was its inability to explain economic growth in the long run. In the neoclassical 
model, because of diminishing marginal returns to capital, growth in the long run depends on 
the rate of innovation. Moreover, the rate of innovation cannot be explained within the model, 
because innovation appears as a public good and will therefore not be produced by profit 
maximizing entrepreneurs.  
 
Attempts to resolve this problem led to models that relaxed the assumption of perfect 
competition and allowed for agglomeration economies. Work by Romer (1986, 1987, 1990), 
Rebelo (1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and others popularized “endogenous growth 
models” which turned out to be major elements in the development of the agglomeration 
view. Another important contribution was the idea of “monopolistic competition” developed 
by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Their model combined product specific monopolies with 
competition between the products and became a cornerstone in many formal agglomeration 
view models. 
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Krugman (1991) and others extended these ideas to two identical regions and investigated the 
economic relations between them. This approach became known as “new economic 
geography”. In order to avoid uninteresting corner solutions, they introduced transportation 
costs as a force counteracting the concentrating tendencies caused by agglomeration 
economies. The relation between the centripedal force of agglomeration economies and the 
centrifugal force of transport costs turns out to be a key parameter for the performance of the 
new economic geography (NEG) models. 
 
The new economic geography version of the agglomeration view has developed out of the 
neoclassical view and therefore shares many of its basic assumptions. As has been mentioned 
above, the agglomeration view can be seen as a generalization of the neoclassical view as it 
introduces agglomeration forces and transportation costs into its basic structures. The 
implications of this seemingly minor adjustment are quite dramatic. Because of these changes 
the agglomeration view models become non-linear and specific results depend to a large 
extent on specific functional forms of equations and on parameter values. The vast majority of 
the respective literature discusses model specifications, assumptions and their implications for 
the properties of the model. The literature dealing with policy consequences is much more 
limited. An important exception is the book by Baldwin et al. (2003) that deals with the 
relation between economic geography and public policy. Although it lays out the properties of 
economic geography models from a policy perspective, it does not take the step that our paper 
does of looking at the implications these properties have for a specific form of policy. 
 
< Figure 1 about here > 
 
The most important properties of the agglomeration view model can be explained easily by 
use of Krugman’s famous “tomahawk bifurcation” (Figure 1). It shows the relationship 
between transportation costs on the horizontal axis and the share of production of region 1 in 
a two region model. The model that produces this graph is a general equilibrium model that 
allows capital and labor in the industry sector to move freely between the regions. To keep 
production from concentrating completely in one of the regions, the NEG-models typically 
assume that in addition to the industry sector there is another sector (e.g., agriculture) which is 
not mobile between the regions. 
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When transportation costs are high, the firms try to stay close to the consumers of the 
immobile sector. Since agglomeration forces are weak relative to transport costs, it does not 
pay for them to cluster production in one of the regions. Since production distributes equally 
between the regions according to the workers/customers in the immobile sector, industrial 
workers also split equally between the regions. The result is a stable equilibrium with 50 per 
cent of production, workers, and customers being located in region 1. 
 
When transport costs are low relative to agglomeration economies, the latter dominate the 
distribution of production. It pays for producers in the industry sector to concentrate all their 
production in one of the regions and to serve both regions from there. The benefits of 
concentrated production outweigh the costs of transporting the products to the customers in 
the other region. Since industrial jobs are concentrated in the one region, industrial workers 
will migrate to this region as well, thus strengthening the concentration of demand as well as 
that of labor. This stabilizes the concentrated production equilibrium, where all industrial 
production will be located in just one region. Only the immobile sector is left in the other 
region.  
 
Since the two regions are assumed to be identical, the model cannot predict in which one of 
the two regions industrial production will concentrate. When transport costs are low enough, a 
small random disturbance may decide between the two options. It is important to note, that 
both are stable equilibria. Once reached, none of the economic actors can gain by deviating 
from the respective equilibrium. 
 
Contrary to the neoclassical model, the NEG model yields multiple equilibria. This is the first 
important property to note. In the range of medium transport costs, there are even three of 
them. As indicated by the dashed vertical line in Figure 1, production may be concentrated in 
region 1 (intersection with the top line), or in region 2 (intersection with the bottom line), or it 
may be split evenly between the two regions (intersection with the middle line). In the latter 
case, industry finds enough demand in each of the regions to keep production located there. 
Concentrating it one of the regions would be uneconomical because of the costs of 
transporting the products to the other region. 
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The second property to see from the tomahawk bifurcation is “path dependence”. Which one 
of the three equilibria in a medium transport costs case will be realized depends on the path 
the economy has taken before. When the economy reached this situation through declining 
transport costs, it will reach this area with production equally split between the regions (the 
only stable equilibrium at high transport costs). Since equal distribution is also a stable 
equilibrium at medium transport costs, this distribution will remain. 
 
When the medium transport costs case is reached through increasing transport costs, 
production will already be concentrated in one of the regions. Since this is also a stable 
equilibrium in the medium transport costs case, this distribution will persist as well. Contrary 
to the neoclassical model, where the effects of disturbances fade away over time and the 
model always returns to the one equilibrium, in the agglomeration view model the long term 
result may depend crucially upon the development in the past. Because of this dependence of 
the long run outcome on the development path, policy interventions may lead the regional 
economy to one long term outcome vis-à-vis another. 
 
A third important property is “catastrophic changes” (indicated by the arrows in Figure 1). 
Suppose that the medium transport costs equilibrium has been reached through declining 
transport costs. Because of the arguments made above, production will remain equally split 
between the regions. However, when transport costs decline even further, at one point this 
equal distribution equilibrium becomes unstable. At this point all the production and all the 
industrial workers will be attracted to one of the two regions. Since this change is not gradual, 
as it is typical for neoclassical models, it is called “catastrophic”. At this point, usually called 
a “bifurcation point”, the economy can “choose” between – in this case – two future 
development paths. One implies the concentration of industrial production and of industrial 
workers in region 1; the other implies their concentration in region 2.  
 
< Figure 2 about here > 
 
When viewed over time, these mechanisms imply a development path like the one sketched in 
Figure 2. This is known as the “pitchfork bifurcation”. On the vertical axis it shows again the 
share of production in region 1 in a system of two identical regions. Instead of a parameter 
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value as in Figure 1, on the horizontal axis we now show time. So, the economy always 
moves from left to right through this graph.  
 
The bifurcation point is located at time t0. At this point in time, the equal distribution 
equilibrium that characterized the system up to this point cannot be sustained any longer and 
the system will either move to the upper branch (all industry concentrated in region 1) or to 
the lower branch (all industry concentrated in region 2) of the pitchfork. This pitchfork 
bifurcation diagram will play a central role in the next section of the paper. 
 
When the economy in its development over time approaches such a bifurcation point, the 
existing equilibrium loses stability and the system can switch to another development path. 
From an a-priori point of view various possible paths of development exist for the region. At 
bifurcation points it may move onto one or the other. Once the path is chosen, path 
dependence sets in and stabilizes the development path until – maybe – another bifurcation 
point is reached. When the economy is approaching a bifurcation point, relatively small 
random events or policy interventions may suffice to guide it toward one of the available 
development paths. At stable periods, away from any bifurcation points, even after substantial 
policy interventions may the economy return to the stable equilibrium path just like in a 
neoclassical economy. 
 
Since the entry of a new producer into a regional economy through the agglomeration forces 
has positive implications for all the already existing firms in the region, the agglomeration 
forces imply an externality. Therefore, the neoclassical result that the equilibrium is Pareto 
efficient and socially optimal does not hold any longer in the case of the agglomeration view. 
The equilibrium that is reached through the market mechanism may be both inefficient and 
socially undesirable. Under the assumptions of the agglomeration view a Pareto efficient and 
socially optimal equilibrium is actually a rather unlikely coincidence.  
 
In the neoclassical view, the standard treatment for externalities that threaten the optimality of 
the market equilibrium is the internalization of the externalities. In the agglomeration view, 
however, the externalities (i.e. the agglomeration forces) are not just a nuisance, but an 
essential part of the economy. Removing them through internalization would lead to the 
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above mentioned structure of “backyard capitalism” and reintroduce all the conceptual 
problems that have eventually led to the development of the agglomeration view. 
 
4 The pitfalls and booby traps of cluster policy 
A need for policy 
What does all this mean for cluster policy when defined as in section 1 of the paper? First of 
all, it should be clear from our previous discussion that cluster policy cannot be justified by 
the neoclassical view. In an economy where the agglomeration of activities does not generate 
any benefits, a policy that attempts to generate such agglomerations does not make any sense. 
Conceptually, cluster policy can only be based on an agglomeration view. A major difference 
between the neoclassical view and the agglomeration view, however, is that only in the 
agglomeration view it is possible for policy to influence the long term performance of a 
regional economy. While in the neoclassical view the economy always returns to its inherent 
development path after some policy intervention, in the agglomeration view that policy 
intervention may move the regional economy toward another equilibrium and thus onto 
another long term development path. 
 
Moreover, the agglomeration view also implies a need for policy; again contrary to the 
neoclassical view. Since the outcome generated by market forces is not necessarily optimal or 
socially desirable in an agglomeration view economy, policy may be needed to move the 
economy to a more desirable equilibrium. So, economic policy in general and cluster policy in 
particular is not only not a useless effort as in the neoclassical view, but may even be a 
necessary intervention for the region to reach a desirable development path. The 
agglomeration view, we can conclude, implies strong support for economic policy, which may 
be implemented in form of cluster policy. 
 
However, cluster policy may be viewed at and implemented quite differently at different 
spatial levels. The support the policy provides for agglomeration of economic activities in one 
region always implies a (relative) loss of economic activities in other regions. Cluster policy 
successfully implemented in region A will always be at the expense of region B. Since it 
strengthens agglomeration economies, such a policy will always redistribute activities and 
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social welfare between regions. While the regional policy maker in the successful region will 
not be bothered by the effect his/her policy has on neighbors, a cluster policy implemented at 
the national level will have to take the resulting disparities between its regions into account. 
Therefore, the optimal cluster policy at the regional level may be quite different from that on 
the national level.  
 
The problems of cluster policy 
The agglomeration view points to a fundamental dilemma: The same mechanisms that 
provide a conceptual basis for cluster policy also make it extremely difficult to design such a 
policy adequately. The term “design” encompasses various aspects: 
 
• The targeting of the policy: What sector should be targeted by the cluster policy? 
• The dosing of the policy: How strong should the cluster policy incentive be? How 
much intervention is needed for a long term effect? 
• The timing of the policy: When is the right time for the cluster policy intervention? 
 
Targeting of the policy 
For cluster policy to be effective, it needs to be targeted to a sector that fulfills at least two 
requirements: (1) it needs to show strong positive agglomeration tendencies, and (2) it needs 
to be available for clustering in the target region. These two requirements are somewhat 
contradictory. The problem is that strong positive agglomeration tendencies cannot be 
observed directly, but only through their clustering of firms of the respective sector. Because 
of this, cluster policy guidelines typically identify potential target sectors for cluster policy 
through the concentration of such sectors in other regions. But sectors that already cluster in 
other – competing – regions may not be available any more for clustering in our region. The 
concentration process that allows us to identify target sectors may already imply such strong 
path dependence that it will be difficult for our cluster policy to attract that sector to our 
region. 
 
Because of this, cluster policy consultants often start by looking for sectors that already 
agglomerate in the respective region, and propose to make them the target of cluster policy. 
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The question that arises then, however, is to what extent cluster policy is necessary to 
agglomerate this sector in the region. The sector has already revealed a tendency to 
agglomerate in our region and the growing concentration of production in this sector in the 
region may automatically lead to a self-sustaining cumulative growth process. Cluster policy 
applied in this situation may generate a windfall gain for the respective companies, but not 
lead to another long term outcome of the development path. The resources allocated to the 
cluster policy will largely be wasted in this case. 
 
Dosing of the policy 
The path dependent development paths and the bifurcation points of the agglomeration view 
imply that threshold levels exist for economic policy. They mark the watershed between the 
different possible equilibria. When the system deviates from the equilibrium without crossing 
the threshold level, it will return to that equilibrium. When the deviation is so strong that the 
economy crosses the threshold, it will converge to another equilibrium.  
 
While threshold levels tend to be very low near bifurcation points, stronger path dependence 
(and lock-in) implies higher and increasing threshold levels. Policy makers have to take this 
into account when dosing their cluster policy. When the system is at a bifurcation point, only 
a minimal policy intervention may be sufficient to permanently move the system in a certain 
direction. When path dependence is strong, even a substantial policy incentive may not be 
sufficient to permanently move the system away from the current development path. 
Consequently, the policy maker will have to adjust the strength of the policy depending on 
where the economy is with respect to a bifurcation point. However, it is quite difficult for the 
policy maker to determine where the economy is with respect to a bifurcation point. In order 
to predict a future bifurcation point, the policy maker would need to know the exact structure 
of the economic system and all the relevant parameters. Empirically, bifurcation points can 
only be identified in retrospect. When we look at the economic trajectory in Figure 2, the 
economy behaves quite normally right up to time period t0. It maintains an equal distribution 
of economic activity between the two regions just like the neoclassical model would predict. 
Only when we move past t0 and see that production begins to concentrate in one of the regions 
we can see that at time period t0 a bifurcation point was passed. 
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The fact that the threshold levels vary over time and in particular with respect to the distance 
from a bifurcation point, makes dosing of cluster policy extremely difficult for the policy 
maker. A dose that may have been too low at an earlier period may turn out to be excessive 
now (or the other way around depending on whether the threshold level is decreasing or 
increasing). Experience from another region will be transferable only when both regions are 
identical in all parameters and are at the same point in time relative to the same bifurcation 
point. It is quite obvious that this will never be the case. 
 
A trial and error approach will not work for the policy maker. Because of the thresholds 
implied in the agglomeration view models, small changes in the dose of the cluster policy 
may lead to completely different outcomes. Up to the threshold level the system's reaction 
may be quite minimal or only temporary. When the policy trial moves the system past the 
threshold level, the change may be catastrophic, i.e., set the system off toward a different 
equilibrium. Since the policy will have moved the economy past the threshold, a reversal of 
the policy will not return the system to the original situation. In that case, the policy maker 
will not be able to correct an error. 
 
Moreover, one has to keep in mind that every policy trial itself changes the constellation of 
the economic system. Even when a certain policy was not successful, it may have lowered or 
raised the threshold for some other policy, making its subsequent success more or less likely. 
This is particularly important in the context of best-practice examples in policy. When a 
policy has been applied successfully in one region, it has altered the economic system and its 
parameters thus changing the chance for other regions to successfully apply the same policy. 
A policy, for example, that successfully established a regional ICT cluster automatically made 
it more difficult for other regions to copy this success, because the other regions will have to 
compete against that established and successful ICT cluster. 
 
Timing of the policy 
One important aspect in terms of timing of the cluster policy has already been mentioned 
above: the fact that near a bifurcation point the system will be much more receptive to policy 
interventions than at other points. This implies that at times near a bifurcation point a certain 
policy instrument may be quite cost effective, while at other times the same policy may be a 
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complete failure and waste of resources. But, since it is quite difficult for policy makers to 
identify these ideal times for policy interventions, chances are high that their policy 
interventions are wasteful. 
 
Because of difficulties to identify problems that need policy action, most likely their policies 
will come too late. In the development path displayed in Figure 2, up to the bifurcation point 
(at t0) there is no obvious problem for the policy maker to detect. Production shares may 
fluctuate around the equal distribution but will automatically return to that equilibrium. In this 
period of time the system actually behaves according to the neoclassical model. Past the 
bifurcation point, a small deviation from an equal distribution may send the system on a 
development trajectory toward one or the other concentrated equilibrium. The policy maker, 
however, may have developed faith in the neoclassical view and the equalizing effect of the 
market forces based on past experience. By the time the policy maker realizes that the 
neoclassical view is inappropriate, that the system agglomerates and does not automatically 
return to an equal distribution, path dependence may be so strong that small policy 
intervention will be in vain. The policy maker not only faces the challenge to detect a new 
problem for which there is no empirical evidence in the immediate past, he/she also has to 
push for a new type of policy at a level that is sufficiently large to overcome path dependence. 
 
To summarize, the three basic problems of cluster policy outlined above – targeting, timing 
and dosing of public action – provoke serious doubts about the effectiveness of initiatives and 
interventions aiming at creating or further developing spatially concentrated sectors in a 
particular region. The agglomeration view, thus, has to be acknowledged for sharpening one’s 
understanding of the potential pitfalls and booby traps of cluster policy actions launched with 
the goal to advance a region’s economic position in the long run. 
 
5 Conclusions 
Promoting clusters has become an important economic development policy tool in many parts 
of the world. As increasing attention is focused by policymakers on developing clusters, the 
question of whether cluster policies are a sound approach for stimulating regional economic 
prosperity assumes greater importance. This paper challenges the “cluster hype” in policy 
from a purely theoretical perspective. We defined cluster policy as a policy that invests 
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resources into the formation, support, and development of one or more industry clusters with 
the goal to strengthen the economic position of their policy’s target area in the long run. We 
considered two alternative bodies of thought, the neoclassical view and the agglomeration 
view, to guide our discussion about rationales for and potential pitfalls of a cluster policy 
approach. It has been shown that within the neoclassical framework cluster policies cannot be 
justified. Adopting an agglomeration view yielded more stimulating insights. We highlighted 
that the agglomeration view implies a fundamental dilemma for cluster policy. On the one 
hand it provides a sound conceptual basis for a proactive cluster policy approach, pointing to 
essential rationales for policy actions. On the other hand, it provides a set of critical 
arguments that suggest a “hands-off” policy approach. We analyzed in more detail three main 
problems, i.e. the targeting, dosing and timing of cluster policy actions. It was demonstrated 
that difficulties related with these issues lead to a rather pessimistic view on the usefulness of 
and prospects for policy interventions in cluster development. 
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Figure 1: The tomahawk bifurcation 
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Figure 2: The pitchfork bifurcation 
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